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1 Introduction 
 
This case deals with several aspects of the general principles of contract, the 
influence of the constitutional values of dignity and equality as regards public policy 
on the validity of contracts, error, cancellation of contracts and the unethical conduct 
of an attorney who found himself in a conflict of interests situation. The matter was 
brought by way of application.1 This is probably the reason that not all possible 
remedies available to the applicants were properly explored or ventilated. Although 
the outcome of the case is probably correct, one cannot help but feel that the 
applicants were afforded minimum justice in the circumstances of the case. 
 
2 Facts of the case 
 
The applicants (married in community of property) were the owners of a farm. 
Because of their age and poor health they became unable to manage the farm and 
fell into arrears with their monthly instalments to the Land Development Bank.2 The 
applicants received a letter of demand for the arrear instalments of R250 000. The 
first applicant consulted with the respondent (a practising attorney) who undertook to 
defend the applicants. He arranged with the Land Bank that all correspondence be 
directed to him and informed the applicants that he had entered into an agreement 
with the Land Bank and that they (the applicants) "should leave everything to him".3 
 
                                                 
*  Jacolien Barnard. LLB (Pret) LLM (Unisa). Lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law, University of 
Pretoria, South Africa (jacolien.barnard@up.ac.za).  
**  Chris Nagel. BA LLB LLD (Pret). Professor of Law, Department of Mercantile Law, University of 
Pretoria, South Africa (cjnagel@lantic.net).  
1  Jordan v Farber Case 1352/09 [2009] ZANCHC 81 15 December 2009 (unreported) – hereafter 
Jordan. 
2  Hereafter the Land Bank. 
3 Jordan para 3. 
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The first applicant also instructed the respondent to find a lessee for the farm. After a 
while, the respondent indicated that he was interested in leasing the farm. The 
parties agreed on rental of R100 000 payable every six months, commencing on 1 
October 2006. The applicants intended to lease the farm for a period of three years 
but the respondent advised them that the Land Bank would only accept a lease of 
nine years and eleven months. The respondent drew up the lease agreement in his 
capacity as legal representative of the applicants, as well as in his personal capacity. 
Relying on the advice of his attorney, the first applicant signed the contract, in terms 
of which the rent was to be paid directly to the Land Bank. The parties also entered 
into a second lease agreement with regard to the remaining livestock. Although the 
applicants were married in community of property, the second applicant did not sign 
either of the lease agreements. 
 
The respondent took occupation of the farm and it only transpired later when the 
applicants were sued by the Land Bank for R400 000 that the respondent had not 
paid the Lank Bank as required in terms of the contract. The respondent also did not 
enter into an agreement with the Land Bank pertaining to the payment terms of the 
outstanding balance. The outstanding balance of R250 000 had escalated to 
R400 000. 
 
The applicants approached the court for a declaratory order in terms of which the 
leases were declared void alternatively cancelled and the respondent was ordered to 
vacate the farm and pay the costs of the application. 
 
3 Arguments by the parties 
 
3.1 The applicants 
 
The applicants presented a three-pronged argument.4 The first was that the 
contracts were void and of no effect as they were contra bonos mores. In support of 
this allegation, the applicants argued that the respondent acted in conflict of interests 
when he drew up the contracts both in his personal capacity and as an attorney for 
                                                 
4 Jordan para 9. 
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the applicants and as such acted to their detriment. According to the applicants, the 
respondent had a duty to advise them (his clients) to seek independent legal advice. 
They further argued that the respondent misled them into believing that the Land 
Bank required them to enter into such a long lease while, in fact, there was no such 
requirement. 
 
The second argument by the applicants was that the respondent disputed the 
amount of rent and that this was indicative of the fact that the parties never reached 
consensus on an material term of the contract. For this reason, it was argued that 
the contract never came into being, "as there was never a meeting of the minds".5 
 
The third argument by the applicants was that the respondent failed to pay the rent 
and in so doing effectively cancelled the contracts. In the alternative, they sought an 
order for the cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondent was 
destroying the property. "For these reasons the applicants contended that the 
contract[s] cannot be enforced."6 
 
3.2 The respondent 
 
The respondent opposed the application on the ground that he had entered into a 
valid lease agreement with the applicants. Secondly, he denied that he was under 
any duty to advise the applicants to seek independent legal advice. Thirdly, he 
contended that there were material disputes of fact such as alleged undue influence 
and misrepresentation that could not be decided on the papers and had to be 
referred to oral evidence.7  
                                                 
5 Jordan para 9.2. 
6 Jordan para 9.3. 
7 Jordan para 10. After hearing oral evidence in this respect and referring to Plascon-Evans Paints 
Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 623 (A), Mjali AJ decided that the matter should 
be decided on the papers (Jordan para 11). 
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4 Decision 
 
4.1 Whether the contracts were contra bonos mores or against public 
policy 
 
The court firstly considered whether the contracts were contra bonos mores. Mjali AJ 
stated that it is "trite"8 that a court would invalidate and refuse to enforce agreements 
that are against public policy and quoted the following dictum from the Constitutional 
Court's judgment in Barkhuizen v Napier:9 
 
The proper approach to the constitutional challenge to contractual terms is to 
determine whether the term challenged is contrary to public policy as 
evidenced by constitutional values, in particular, those found in the Bill of 
Rights. This approach leaves space for the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda 
to operate, but at the same time allows courts to decline to enforce 
contractual terms that are in conflict with constitutional values even though 
the parties may have consented to them. 
 
Despite the fact that the first applicant signed the contracts and thereby 
acknowledged that the terms thereof were reasonable and essential for the mutual 
benefit of the parties, the court felt it necessary to enquire whether, despite the 
signing of the agreements, such agreements were consistent with the Constitution,10 
and were reasonable and not contrary to public policy.11 
 
The court referred to Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom,12 in which the Supreme Court 
of Appeal recognised that unequal bargaining power is a factor that together with 
other factors plays a role in the consideration of public policy. According to Mjali AJ 
this was a recognition of the potential injustice that may be caused by inequality of 
bargaining powers.13 
 
                                                 
8 Jordan para 12. 
9 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 30 (hereafter Barkhuizen). 
10  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
11 Jordan paras 12–14. 
12 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) – hereafter Afrox Healthcare. 
13 Jordan para 15. 
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The court acknowledged the tremendous power that attorneys wield over vulnerable, 
emotional clients who depend on them to handle their affairs in stressful situations. 
In casu, the applicants were in grave financial trouble, as nobody wanted to lease 
the farm and they were in danger of losing it. They were in no position to refuse or 
scrutinise the advice given to them by the respondent. This was also an indication to 
the court of the immense bargaining power the respondent had vis-à-vis the 
applicants.14 
 
The court stated that another reason for holding that the contract was against public 
policy – and which was of great concern to the court – was the fact that the 
respondent breached the standards of professional ethics by knowingly entering into 
a business transaction with his clients while failing to advise them to seek 
independent legal advice before entering into the lease agreements with them. By 
misleading the clients to enter into such a long lease and drafting an agreement 
without taking the best interests of the clients into account the respondent placed 
himself in a conflict of interest situation.15  
 
The court placed great emphasis on the loyalty and professional ethics expected 
from an attorney16 and had no difficulty in finding that the respondent had placed 
himself in a situation in which his loyalty was divided or he compromised the 
interests of the applicants. In this regard, the court mentioned that the respondent 
himself admitted that he had to take his own interests into account, his view that he 
was under no duty to refer the applicants for independent legal advice, and the 
unprofessional manner in which the lease agreements were drafted (no provision 
was made for the escalation of rent, there was no non-variation clause and certain 
provisions were ambiguous).17 
 
                                                 
14 Jordan para 16. 
15 Jordan para 17. 
16 The court described (Jordan para 22) the respondent's lack of appreciation of the seriousness of 
his transgression of the rules of professional conduct as "an extremely worrying feature". This 
was evident from his allegation that he was under no duty to advise the applicants to seek 
independent legal advice as well as the submission made by his counsel that "[the first applicant] 
is not a zombie, he is somebody with a mind of his own and for sure he can think about what his 
attorney says to him. Otherwise each and everybody will just sit back and say I trust my attorney 
I don't even read the papers because I trust my attorney. Jy kan nie net blindelings jou prokureur 
vertrou nie". 
17 Jordan para 18. 
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Based on a dictum by Kirk-Cohen J in Law Society, Transvaal v Mathews,18 Mjali AJ 
not only regarded the respondent's conduct in this matter as "reprehensible and 
unbecoming",19 but held that, by any standard, he acted "disgracefully, dishonestly 
and unfairly".20 The court therefore came to the conclusion that the contracts in 
question were against public policy, bearing in mind the following statement by 
Smalberger JA in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes:21  
 
No court shall shrink from the duty of declaring a contract contrary to public 
policy when the occasion so demands. The power to declare contracts 
contrary to public policy should however, be exercised sparingly and only in 
the clearest of cases, lest uncertainty as to the validity of contracts result 
from arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the power. One must be careful not 
to conclude that a contract is contrary to public policy merely because its 
terms (or some of them) offend one's individual sense of propriety and 
fairness. 
 
Mjali AJ felt convinced that the agreements between the parties fell squarely within 
the category of the clearest of cases that were contrary to public policy. The court 
therefore declared the contracts void ab initio on this ground alone,22 but for the sake 
of completeness proceeded to consider the questions whether the relevant contracts 
had been cancelled and whether there had been a meeting of the minds of the 
parties. 
 
4.2 Cancellation 
 
The court noted that the respondent failed to perform in terms of the contracts, which 
prompted the applicants to take steps to cancel the contracts, which they eventually 
did. Mjali AJ was satisfied that the steps taken constituted a valid cancellation of the 
contracts and that, for that reason, the contracts could not be enforced.23 
                                                 
18 1989 4 SA 389 (T) 395F. 
19 Jordan para 23. 
20 Jordan para 24. 
21 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9B (hereafter Sasfin). 
22 Jordan para 25. 
23 Jordan para 32. 
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4.3 Absence of consensus 
 
The applicants submitted that the respondent disputed the amount of rental for the 
farm and therefore the parties never reached consensus on a material term of the 
contract, and consequently that it should be declared void ab initio.24 The respondent 
argued that the parties entered into only one agreement in respect of the livestock 
and the farm, and that the written agreement was not a true reflection of what the 
parties agreed upon.25 The court considered these disputes of fact between the 
parties and their influence on consensus:26 
 
[I]f the version of the respondent that he has at all material times laboured 
under the impression that amount of rent is R100 000.00 per annum, 
payable in R50 000.00 instalments, is to be believed it cannot be said that 
there was any meeting of the minds between the parties. 
 
Further the fact that according to the respondent it was the intention of the 
parties to conclude one agreement in respect of livestock and the farm 
whereas the applicants state the contrary indicates that there was no 
consensus. 
 
For these reasons, Mjali AJ held that the contract(s) should be declared void ab 
initio.  
 
4.4 The order made 
 
The court declared the lease agreements void, alternatively cancelled, and ordered 
the respondent to vacate the leased premises and pay the costs of the application. 
The Registrar was ordered to forward a copy of the judgment to the Law Society of 
which the respondent was a member. 
                                                 
24 Jordan para 26. 
25 Jordan para 28. 
26 Jordan para 33. 
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5 Comments 
 
5.1 Contracts against goods morals or public policy 
 
Although the court interchanges between describing the contracts as being contra 
bonos mores and/or against public policy,27 nothing really turns on this, since in both 
instances the offending contracts are illegal and the fundamental distinction between 
the two categories is unclear.28  
 
It is submitted that the court's decision in this regard is in accordance with the 
cautionary approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal,29 endorsed by the 
Constitutional Court as being a sound approach,30 to the effect that judges should 
use their power to intervene and declare contracts or contractual terms freely 
entered into void/unenforceable, sparingly, with perceptive restraint and only in the 
clearest of cases in which the impropriety of the transaction and public harm are 
manifest. It is further submitted that the decision is in accordance with the most 
recent judgments of our highest courts to the effect that the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda31 does not reign supreme32 and that contracts or contractual terms that are 
inimical to the fundamental values of, inter alia, dignity and equality33 will not pass 
                                                 
27  Jordan paras 12, 14, 15–19 and 24. 
28 Van der Merwe et al Contract 193, especially n 10; Hutchison and Pretorius Contract 174 ff; see 
Brummer v Gorfil Brothers Investments (Pty) Ltd 1999 3 SA 389 (SCA) – hereafter Brummer. 
29 See eg Sasfin; Botha (now Griessel) v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd 1989 3 SA 773 (A); Brummer; De 
Beer v Keyser 2002 1 SA 827 (SCA); Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) – hereafter Brisley; 
Afrox Healthcare; Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-Operative Ltd 2004 6 SA 
66 (SCA); South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 (SCA) – hereafter 
South African Forestry Co Ltd; and Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) – hereafter Napier. 
30 Barkhuizen para 30. 
31 "On the one hand, public policy, as informed by the Constitution, requires, in general, that parties 
should comply with contractual obligations that have been freely and voluntarily undertaken. This 
consideration is expressed in the maxim pacta sunt servanda which, as the Supreme Court of 
Appeal has repeatedly noted ... gives effect to the central constitutional values of freedom and 
dignity. Self-autonomy, or the ability to regulate one's own affairs, even to one's own detriment, is 
the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity. The extent to which the contract was 
freely and voluntarily concluded is clearly a vital factor as it will determine the weight that should 
be afforded to the values of freedom and dignity" – per Ngcobo J in Barkhuizen para 57. 
32 "All law, including the common law of contract, is now subject to constitutional control. The 
validity of all law depends on their consistency with the provisions of the Constitution and the 
values that underlie our Constitution. The application of the principle pacta sunt servanda is, 
therefore, subject to constitutional control" – per Ngcobo J in Barkhuizen para 15. 
33 "Public policy in any event nullifies agreements offensive in themselves – a doctrine of very 
considerable antiquity. In its modern guise, 'public policy' is now rooted in our Constitution and 
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constitutional muster, being against public policy.34 Finally, the judge took great care 
to bring the decision in line with that of Brand JA in Afrox Healthcare,35 endorsed by 
Ngcobo J in Barkhuizen,36 namely that unequal bargaining power37 is not the only 
factor, but a factor that together with other factors should be considered when 
determining whether a contract or contractual term is against public policy.38 
 
On the other hand, one may argue that the respondent's unethical conduct, 
misrepresentation and abuse of position rather relate to the improper manner in 
which the first applicant's consent to the leases was obtained, than to the legality of 
the agreements as such. Put differently: despite the difference in bargaining power 
and the absence of an escalation clause, the leases would have been to the mutual 
benefit of the parties, provided that there was reciprocal performance – why should 
the contracts now be considered invalid because of public policy or public interest 
just because one of the parties defaulted? 
                                                                                                                                                        
the fundamental values it enshrines. These include human dignity, the achievement of equality 
and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism" – per 
Cameron JA in Brisley para 91. He reflected the same sentiments in Napier para 7.  
34 "What public policy is and whether a term in a contract is contrary to public policy must now be 
determined by reference to the values that underlie our constitutional democracy as given 
expression by the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Thus a term in a contract that is inimical to the 
values enshrined in our Constitution is contrary to public policy and is, therefore, unenforceable. 
In my view, the proper approach to the constitutional challenges to contractual terms is to 
determine whether the term challenged is contrary to public policy as evidenced by the 
constitutional values, in particular, those found in the Bill of Rights. This approach leaves space 
for the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda to operate, but at the same time allows courts to decline 
to enforce contractual terms that are in conflict with the constitutional values even though the 
parties may have consented to them" – per Ngcobo J in Barkhuizen paras 29–30. 
35 Afrox Healthcare. 
36 "Although the court found ultimately that on the facts there was no evidence of an inequality of 
bargaining power, this does not detract from the principle enunciated in that case, namely, that 
the relative situation of the contracting parties is a relevant consideration in determining whether 
a contractual term is contrary to public policy. I endorse this principle. This is an important 
principle in a society as unequal as ours" – per Ngcobo J in Barkhuizen para 59. 
37 The following statement by Christie Contract 18 is quite apposite in casu, namely that inequality 
of bargaining power "is a problem that has long bothered contract lawyers throughout the world 
because it often seems unfair to enforce a contract when it is obvious that the one party was in 
such a weak bargaining position that consent, even if genuine, was at best reluctant". 
38 See, by way of comparison, Breedenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2009 5 SA 304 
(GSJ) and Breedenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2009 6 SA 277 (GSJ), in which the 
same set of facts regarding unequal bargaining power gave rise to two divergent decisions. The 
appeal against the latter decision was dismissed in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank Case 599/09 
[2010] ZASCA 75 27 May 2010. See Nortje 2010 THRHR 517 ff for an informative discussion of 
these decisions. 
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5.2 Fraudulent misrepresentation 
 
Bearing in mind that the applicants alleged that they were misled in so far as the 
Land Bank never required such a long lease, it is surprising that the court mentioned 
this separate ground (intentional or fraudulent misrepresentation through which 
consensus is obtained by improper means) almost only in passing, linking it to the 
respondent's unethical conduct by stating: 
 
Further by misleading his clients into entering into a long lease agreement 
and then drafting a contract without taking into account the best interests of 
the clients. In this way the respondent placed himself in a conflict of interest 
situation. 
 
It is submitted that the respondent's fraudulent misrepresentation should have been 
severed from the conflict of interest situation and considered separately as another 
independent ground for setting aside the contract and claiming damages.39 If the 
contracts were in fact valid,40 this was perhaps the best route for the applicants to 
follow, since in this manner they could have recouped the any damages41 that they 
had suffered in the process.42 Even where the leases were invalid, as in the present 
case, we submit that a claim for damages would lie, being a broad delictual claim for 
fraudulent misrepresentation giving rise to pure economic loss.43 However, this 
would probably not have been a viable option, as the case was brought by way of 
                                                 
39 See eg Christie Contract 296: "In a straightforward case between the parties to a contract the 
innocent party may bring his claim for damages for fraud together with a claim for rescission, 
because damages for fraud, unlike damages for breach of contract, are in no sense an 
enforcement of the contract and are therefore not inconsistent with rescission for fraudulent 
misrepresentation." See generally Christie Contract 271 ff; Van der Merwe et al Contract 105 ff; 
Hutchison and Pretorius Contract 125 ff; Visser et al Damages 375 ff. 
40 See as regards the distinction between dolus dans locum contractui and dolus incidens in 
contractu Christie Contract 298; Erasmus and Gauntlett "Damages" para 65; Van Rensburg et al 
"Contract" para 150; Visser et al Damages 376; and Van der Merwe et al Contract 139.  
41 Erasmus and Gauntlett "Damages" para 65 explain as follows: "Where the misrepresentee 
chooses to resile, the measure of damages is easily stated: it is that sum which will restore the 
misrepresentee to his or her patrimonial position prior to the misrepresentation, or the sum of all 
losses sustained as a direct consequence of having been induced to enter into the contract."  
42 As far as legal causation is concerned, Christie Contract 296 succinctly summarises the position 
as follows: "As with all claims for delictual damages, the plaintiff must prove that the delict, in this 
case the fraudulent misrepresentation, was related to the loss suffered as cause and effect in a 
sufficiently direct fashion to be regarded as the legally effective cause of the loss." 
43 The circumstances surrounding the invalid leases would be part of the evidence regarding the 
way in which the fraud was perpetrated and the resulting losses were sustained. 
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application and therefore had to be decided on the papers alone without the benefit 
of oral evidence, cross-examination and so forth. 
 
5.3 Cancellation 
 
As mentioned earlier, the court was satisfied that the applicants took sufficient and 
proper steps to cancel the contracts in question following the respondent's default. 
The judgment is very brief in this regard and not much is revealed as to the steps 
taken by the applicants, which means that its correctness on this point cannot really 
be evaluated. What is startlingly incorrect, however, is the allegation made by the 
applicants that the respondent, by failing to pay the rental to the Land Bank, 
"effectively cancelled the contract". Without the benefit of having the original court 
documents available, one can only wonder whether this was in effect the actual 
allegation made by counsel. Of course, the respondent's failure to pay rent in terms 
of the lease amounted, at best, to breach of contract in the form of mora debitoris, 
which would have entitled the first applicant to cancel the contract – something that 
he apparently did. 
 
One may also perhaps construe the first applicant's statement that the respondent 
"effectively cancelled the contract" as in effect alleging that the respondent had 
repudiated his obligations in terms of the contract and that he was therefore guilty of 
this form of breach of contract. The test for repudiation is an objective one,44 namely 
whether the conduct of one contractant was such that a reasonable person in the 
position of the other contractant would infer that he/she, without lawful grounds, did 
not intend to comply with his/her duties in terms of the contract.45 Although this 
possibility appears attractive, one must be careful to categorise the respondent's 
conduct as repudiation, since something more than a mere failure to perform is 
                                                 
44 The fact that the respondent himself alleged that he had a valid contract with the applicant is 
therefore irrelevant. 
45 See eg Datacolor International (Pty) Ltd v Intamarket (Pty) Ltd 2001 2 SA 284 (SCA); South 
African Forestry Co Ltd per Brand JA at para 18: "Repudiation occurs where one party, without 
lawful grounds, indicates to the other party, by word or conduct, a deliberate and unequivocal 
intention that all or some of the obligations arising from the contract will not be performed in 
accordance with its true tenor." See also the discussions by Van der Merwe et al Contract 362 ff, 
Christie Contract 516 ff and Van Rensburg et al "Contract" para 241; Hutchison and Pretorius 
Contract 295 ff. 
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apparently required for repudiation.46 However, if in the present case the 
respondent's total failure to pay any rent may have been construed as repudiation, 
this ground would have sufficed for cancelling the contracts and claiming damages 
without all the requirements and prerequisites that mora debitoris entails.47 
 
5.4 Formalities 
 
Section 1(1) of the Formalities in respect of Leases of Land Act48 does not prescribe 
any formalities for the valid creation of leases of land. Therefore, one finds it 
surprising that while the court said that it "is worth noting" that the leases were not 
signed by the second applicant (Mrs Jordan),49 this was never mentioned again in 
the judgment. Surely, if it was worth noting, one would have expected the judge to 
elaborate on the effect of the fact that one of the parties to the marriage in 
community of property did not sign the leases in question after it was apparently 
agreed by the parties (first applicant and respondent) themselves to make use of 
formalities (reducing the leases to writing and signing them).50 In addition, one would 
perhaps have expected an explanation of the possible operation and effect51 in casu 
of Section 15(2)(a) and (b) of the Matrimonial Property Act,52 which provides that a 
spouse in a marriage in community of property shall not without the written consent 
of the other spouse 
 
(a) alienate, mortgage, burden with a servitude or confer any other real 
right in any immovable property forming part of the joint estate; 
(b) enter into any contract for the alienation, mortgaging, burdening with a 
servitude or conferring of any other real right in immovable property 
forming part of the joint estate.53 
 
                                                 
46 See Van der Merwe et al Contract 362. 
47 See generally Van der Merwe et al Contract 339 ff; Christie Contract 497 ff; Van Rensburg et al 
"Contract" para 219 ff; Hutchison and Pretorius Contract 278 ff. 
48 18 of 1969. 
49 Jordan para 6. 
50 See generally Christie Contract 105–109; Van der Merwe et al Contract 153 ff. 
51 See Amalgamated Banks of South Africa Bpk v De Goede 1997 4 SA 66 (A); Gounder v Top 
Spec Investments (Pty) Ltd 2008 5 SA 151 (SCA). 
52 88 of 1984. 
53 In terms of S 15(5), such written consent shall be attested by two competent witnesses. 
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Although the contract of lease itself does not confer a real right in respect of the 
property to the lessee, the latter does acquire a real right in the circumstances 
explained as follows by Kerr:54 
 
In itself the contract of lease no more gives rise to a real right in the lessee 
than the contract of sale in itself gives rise to ownership in the buyer. In the 
case of a short lease the lessee has a real right when he has gone into 
occupation of the property; in the cased of a long lease he has it after 
registration. 
 
Although the Act is silent on the consequences of non-compliance, it is submitted 
that in the present case the lease in respect of the farm was void because of the lack 
of consent as required by Section 15.55 
 
5.5 Undue influence? 
 
Another avenue that could have been explored is whether the two leases could have 
been rescinded because of undue influence.56 In this regard, the following statement 
by Morris,57 referring to Armstrong v Magid58 and Miller v Muller,59 is quite apposite 
to the facts of the case under discussion: 
 
Perhaps one of the most important duties owed by an attorney to his client is 
not to take advantage of the influence which, in many cases, he may be able 
to exercise over the client. Inevitably the client trusts his attorney, or one 
would find him taking his business elsewhere, and inevitably the attorney will 
become acquainted with the financial position of the client to an extent which 
goes beyond the bounds of the matter in hand. It is very easy for the attorney 
                                                 
54 Sale and Lease 438. This statement is repeated by Kerr and Glover "Lease" para 43. 
55 See Van Schalkwyk Family Law 160; Amalgamated Bank of South Africa Ltd v Lydenburg 
Passenger Services CC 1995 3 SA 314 (T); Bopape v Moloto 2000 1 SA 383 (T). The 
respondent in the present matter was an experienced attorney who probably knew or reasonably 
ought to have known that the contracts in question were entered into in contravention of S 15(2) 
and 15(9) of the Act therefore does not apply. See also Steyn 2002 SALJ 253. 
56 This ground of rescission was recognised by the Appellate Division in Preller v Jordaan 1956 1 
SA 483 (A). See also Patel v Grobbelaar 1974 1 SA 532 (A) and Hofer v Kevitt 1998 1 SA 382 
(SCA). The requirements as expressed by the courts are: The contractant who wishes to raise 
undue influence must prove that the other party acquires an influence over him which weakened 
his resistance and made his will pliable; and that such party then used his influence in an 
unscrupulous manner in order to persuade him to agree to a prejudicial transaction into which, 
with normal freedom of will, he would not have entered. See also Van der Merwe et al Contract 
126; Hutchison and Pretorius Contract 141 ff.  
57 Technique in Litigation 12. 
58 1937 AD 260. 
59 1965 4 SA 458 (C) 462–463. 
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to be in a position to benefit himself by means of transactions with his client 
or to take advantage of his client's circumstances. For this reason, at any 
rate where the client has not had the benefit of independent legal advice, 
there is the risk that any transaction entered into between them may be set 
aside on the ground of undue influence. 
 
As pointed out by Van der Merwe et al,60 if undue influence is regarded as a delict61 
a claim for damages should lie provided that damages can be proved. However, the 
courts have not yet considered a claim for damages on this ground.62 The case 
under discussion, having been brought by way of application, was probably not the 
correct forum for entertaining the possibility of making good the applicants' financial 
losses in this way. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
When one considers the end result of this judgment, it seems fair to say that the 
applicant received what he asked for, namely an order forcing the respondent off the 
farm as quickly as possible.  
 
However, what remains worrisome is the fact that the applicant lost a great deal of 
money in the process, since the respondent did not pay any rent in terms of the 
"leases" and as a result, as mentioned at the start of this discussion, the applicant's 
outstanding balance owing to the Land Bank had escalated from R250 000 to 
R400 000. Seeing that the leases were declared invalid63 for being in conflict with 
public policy, there were no contracts in terms of which the arrear rentals and 
escalated indebtedness to the Land Bank could be recovered from the respondent. 
No attempt was made to recover any damages on any of the other possible grounds 
discussed above. It almost appears that the applicant was so bent on getting rid of 
the respondent as soon as possible that the question of damages passed him by. It 
is submitted that the applicant's last hope would have been, apart from eviction of 
the respondent, to bring a claim for arrear rentals based on unjust enrichment. 
                                                 
60 Contract 129. 
61 See their discussion of the various requirements or elements in Contract 126–129. 
62 See also Van Rensburg et al "Contract" para 158. 
63 If the contracts were valid, the applicant would have been entitled to rely on the lex commissoria 
and remedies for recovery of arrear rentals and damages provided for in Cl 7 of the lease 
pertaining to the farm quoted in Jordan para 6. 
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Whichever way one looks at it, the case still seems to have an unfortunate outcome 
as far as the applicants are concerned. Perhaps a better tactic would have been to 
ventilate the whole matter by way of action procedure so that all possible avenues 
might have been explored. 
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